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DOMESTIC RELATIONS-SEPARATION AGREEMENT
PROVISION FOR CHILD'S COLLEGE EDUCATION HELD
BINDING IN AN ACTION FOR CHILD SUPPORT-
BODEN v. BODEN
In 1960, Janet and James Boden executed a separation agreement
in New York which provided that James Boden would pay $150 per
month for the support of their only child, Janet Matthews Boden, who
at the time was three years old. The agreement also obligated James
Boden to "[p]ay for the college education of said child and to that end
[to] cause a life insurance . . . policy in the principal sum of $7,500 to
be written on his life, to mature 15 years from date hereof, and to pay
all premiums thereon."' In 1961, the Bodens were divorced pursuant
to a California decree which awarded custody of the child to her
mother but made no provision for support for mother or daughter.
The separation agreement was neither incorporated nor merged in
the divorce decree.
James Boden faithfully discharged his obligations under the sep-
aration agreement. Nevertheless, when the daughter entered college,
the mother brought an action in family court seeking reasonable sup-
port for the child, alleging that the father had failed to provide such
support since June, 1975. The mother, who had not remarried but
who had an income of $45,000, found the $7,500 provided by the
insurance endowment policy plus the $150 monthly support payments
to be wholly insufficient to cover the cost of her daughter's educa-
tion at Yale University.2 She asked the court to increase the father's
support obligation to $15,170.99 per year. The father, who had re-
married and who had an annual income of $43,000, argued that he
had no obligation to provide anything more than had been agreed
upon.
The Family Court, New York County, denied the mother's re-
1. Boden v. Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210, 211, 366 N.E.2d 791, 793, 397 N.Y.S.2d
701, 702 (1977) (quoting separation agreement between Janet and .Tames Boden,
May 16, 1960). The agreement continued as follows:
The proceeds of such policy shall be used for the purpose of such college
education .... Such policy shall provide that the proceeds are to be applied
for such college education with the further proviso that if said child shall die,
or shall attain the age of 21 years without having attended college, then the
proceeds of such policy shall be paid to [James Boden].
Id.
2. The proceeds of the insurance policy were $1,875 annually. 42 N.Y.2d at 212,
366 N.E.2d at 793, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
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quest.3 A divided Appellate Division reversed and awarded $250 per
month.4 In a unanimous decision, however, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the family
court order. Held: While the courts do have the power to modify
child support provisions in separation agreements, it is an abuse of
discretion to do so without a showing that an unforeseen change in
circumstances has occurred, or that the original agreement was not
fair and equitable when made. Boden v. Boden, 42 N.Y.2d 210, 366
N.E.2d 791, 397 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1977).
The New York Family Court Act requires a parent to support
his or her child,5 and, as it is currently written, imposes this obliga-
tion primarily on the child's father.6 While the mother's financial con-
dition may properly be considered in a child support determination,7
3. Order entered in Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co., February 25, 1976.
4. Boden v. Boden, 55 A.D.2d 550, 389 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1st Dep't 1976).
5.
The father of a child under the age of twenty-one years is chargeable with
the support of his child and, if possessed of sufficient means or able to earn
such means, may be required to pay for such child's support a fair and reason-
able sum according to his means, as the court may determine.
N.Y. FAri. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1975).
If the father of a child is dead, incapable of supporting his child, or cannot
be found within the state, the mother of such child is chargeable with its sup-
port where such child has not attained the age of twenty-one years and, if
possessed of sufficient means or able to earn such means, may be required to
pay for its support a fair and reasonable sum according to her means, as
the court may determine. The court may apportion the costs of the support...
between the parents according to their respective means and responsibilities.
Id. § 14.
6. The constitutionality of this allocation of the burden of supporting a child has
recently been attacked on equal protection grounds. In Carole K. v. Arnold K., 85
Misc. 2d 643, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1976), Judge Dembitz, consider-
ing sections 413 and 414 of the Family Court Act together, read the latter section as
providing that a mother becomes liable for support only if the father "is dead, in-
capable of supporting his child, or cannot be found within the state." As such, she held
the sections unconstitutional. Id. at 645. Two weeks after the Boden decision, the
Appellate Division unanimously imposed equal responsibility for support upon the par.
ents by excising the portions of sections 413 and 414 that it found to be offensive to
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution. Carter v. Carter, 58
A.D.2d 438, 397 N.Y.S.2d 88 (2d Dep't 1977). Other courts have recognized the
constitutional issue without addressing it. See, e.g., Bauer v. Bauer, 55 A.D.2d 895, 390
N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d Dep't 1977).
7. Bauer v. Bauer, 55 A.D.2d 895, 390 N.Y.S.2d 209 (2d Dep't 1977); Lewis v.
Lewis, 5 A.D.2d 674, 168 N.Y.S.2d 473 (2d Dep't 1959); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 414
(McKinney 1975).
Some courts have directly compared parental incomes in evaluating the adequacy
of a child support award. See, e.g., Maderas v. Turner, 50 A.D.2d 770, 377
N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1975) (award decreased from $239.50 to $195 per month
where mother earned $14,000 and father received only a limited income from Social
Security and the Veterans Administration); Dicker v. Dicker, 54 Misc. 2d 1089, 283
N.Y.S.2d 941 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1967) (father will not be required to pay his child's
college tuition where his salary is $9,900 and the mother's is $12,670).
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her statutory obligation is secondary.8 Regardless of how the child
support obligation is statutorily apportioned, however, a husband and
wife may reallocate the burden between themselves via a support
agreement.0
While binding upon both of the parents,10 a support agreement
does not bind the children, since they are not parties to it." Thus, if
an action is brought on behalf of a child alleging that he is being
inadequately supported under the terms of such an agreement, a
court, which has an obligation to advance and protect the rights of
the children of divorced parents, will not be bound by the terms of
the agreement.' 2 In fact, section 461 (a) of the Family Court Act
8. This unequal allocation of the burden of supporting a child was upheld by the
New York Court of Appeals in 1973, in Maule v. Kaufman, 33 N.Y.2d 58, 304 N.E.2d
234, 349 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1973). There, in a five-to-two decision, the court allowed a
mother to recover a child support deficit incurred over a seven-year period, even though
she and the step-father had supported the child for those years. Undisputed testimony
indicated that upon her remarriage the mother had demanded child support from the
father, setting up an expectation of reimbursement. Thus, despite the mother's actual
support of the child, the father's duty to support was found to be superceding. The
mother's right to recoupment has existed in New York since 1924: "[A] wife who has
applied her separate estate to the purpose of an obligation resting primarily upon her
husband may now recover from him the reasonable amounts which she . . . expended
out of her separate estate in discharge of his obligation." Laumeier v. Laumeier, 237
N.Y. 357, 365, 143 N.E. 219, 221 (1924).
Most of the New York cases have applied sections 413 and 414 to require a father
to shoulder the responsibility of supporting his child if he is able to do so. See, e.g.,
Drazin v. Drazin, 31 A.D.2d 531, 295 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1st Dep't 1968); Haslett v.
Haslett, 25 A.D.2d 256, 268 N.Y.S.2d 809 (3d Dep't 1966) ; Brownstein v. Brownstein,
25 A.D.2d 205, 268 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1st Dep't 1966).
9. See Bleck v. Bleck, 1 A.D.2d 839, 148 N.Y.S.2d 786 (2d Dep't 1956) (payment
of child's expenses); cf. Berland v. Berland, 47 A.D.2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d 111 (2d
Dep't 1975) (payment of child's college tuition).
10. Stoddard v. Stoddard, 227 N.Y. 13, 124 N.E. 91 (1919); Johnson v. Johnson,
206 N.Y. 561, 100 N.E. 408, (1912); Eisen v. Eisen, 48 A.D.2d 652, 367 N.Y.S.2d
554 (2d Dep't 1975); see Hettich v. Hettich, 304 N.Y. 8, 105 N.E.2d 601 (1952);
N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAw § 5-311 (McKinney 1978).
A contract between husband and wife providing for the wife's support is binding
unless it is unfair, in which case it will be void in equity. Tirrell v. Tirrell, 232 N.Y.
224, 133 N.E. 569 (1921); Fales v. Fales, 160 Misc. 799, 290 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1936). This would appear to be the derivation of the "fair and equitable"
standard applied by the Court of Appeals in Boden to child support-not alimony.
11. See In re Wosnitzner's Estate, 47 A.D.2d 402, 366 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1st Dep't),
appeal dismissed, 37 N.Y.2d 919, 340 N.E.2d 749, 378 N.Y.S.2d 389 (1975); Schiller
v. Mann, 44 A.D.2d 686, 353 N.Y.S.2d 816 (2d Dep't 1974); Moat v. Moat, 27
A.D.2d 895, 277 N.Y.S.2d 921 (3d Dep't 1967); Kulok v. Kulok, 20 A.D.2d 568,
245 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't 1963).
12. The Third Department has stated:
When matrimonial difficulties result in broken homes, the courts are man-
dated to provide for the children's support, custody and welfare "as justice re-
quires." . . . [T]hat mandate may or may not be complied with if the court
in every instance gives blind adherence to what the parties have decided be-
19781
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specifically states that a parental duty to support a child can be neither
eliminated nor diminished by a separation agreement, and it vests
the family court with the power to issue a support order if one has
not previously been made.13 section 461 (a) delineates no standard,
such as changed circumstances, for issuing such an order, but instead
refers to the parental duties set forth in sections 413 and 414.14 Thus,
as long as the father is living and is not yet subject to a court order
for his child's support, a previously written separation agreement
should pose no obstacle to the issuance of such an order upon applica-
tion by the mother or by another acting on the child's behalf. This
does not mean that such an agreement is irrelevant, however. In
determining the proper allocation of the support obligation between
a mother and father, it may be reasonable for a court to defer to the
agreement, if its provisions for child support are adequate.', If they
are not, a court should disregard the agreement and issue an order
for support according to an independent determination of both the
child's needs and the financial abilities of the parents.1
Where an action is brought to modify a support order that has
already been issued, section 461 (b) applies.17 This would include a
tween themselves. In any event it is safe to say that such agreements will be
subject to the closest and most careful scrutiny.
Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 278 A.D. 446, 448, 106 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240 (3d Dep't 1951)
(citation omitted).
13. For the text of sections 413 and 414, see note 5 supra. Section 461 (a) states:
A separation agreement, a decree of separation and a final decree or judg-
ment terminating a marriage relationship does not eliminate or diminish
either parent's duty to support a child of the marriage under sections four hun-
dred thirteen and four hundred fourteen of this article. In the absence of an
order of the supreme court or of another court of competent jurisdiction re-
quiring support of the child, the family court may entertain a petition and
make an order for its support.
N.Y. FAAi. CT. ACT § 461(a) (McKinney 1975).
14. See note 13 supra.
15. See Cohen v. Cohen, 28 Misc. 2d 558, 212 N.Y.S.2d 809 (Sup. Ct., Bronx
Co. 1961). The adequacy standard is derived from section 413 of the Family Court
Act: "a fair and reasonable sum according to [the father's] means." N.Y. FAA1. CT. AcT
§ 413 (McKinney 1975).
16. This would appear to follow from the rule that a child's right to support
cannot be diminished by an agreement between his or her parents. See notes 11-13 &
accompanying text supra.
17.
If an order of the supreme court or of another court of competent juris-
diction requires support of the child, the family court may
(i) entertain an application to enforce the order requiring sup-
port; or
(ii) entertain an application to modify such order on the ground
that changed circumstances requires such modification,
unless the order of the supreme court provides that the supreme court retains
exclusive jurisdiction to enforce or modify the order.
N.Y. FAm. CT. ACT § 461(b) (McKinney 1975).
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situation in which a support order has been issued by a New York
court pursuant either to section 461 (a) of the Family Court Act or
to section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law, which vests the su-
preme court with discretionary power to include provisions for child
support in a decree of separation, annulment, or divorce. 18 In addition,
section 461 (b) would apply if a support order has been issued by a
competent court of a foreign jurisdiction. Unlike section 461 (a),
however, section 461 (b) does require a showing of changed circum-
stances before a court may issue a new order.19
18. Section 240 provides in relevant part:
In any action or proceeding brought (1) to annual a marriage, or to
declare the nullity of a void marriage, or (2) for a separation, or (3) for a
divorce, or (4) to obtain, by a writ of habeas corpus or by petition and order
to show cause, the custody of or right to visitation with any child of a mar-
riage, the court must give such direction, between the parties, for the custody,
care, education and maintenance of any child of the parties, as, in the court's
discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the case and
of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child.
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1977) (emphasis added).
In contrast, section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law provides that "the court
may direct the husband to provide suitably for the support of the wife. .. " Id. § 236
(emphasis added). The hortative nature of section 240 may reflect a legislative concern
that all children of divorced parents be judicially assured of support.
19. When courts have been faced with requests to modify a child support order,
they have been unwilling to do so unless more than a minimal change of circumstances
has been shown. The rationale for this rule is to limit to one occasion the court's con-
sideration of any one set of facts. "This accords with the fundamental principle that
litigation must have an end and that a court, having performed its function, may not
lightly be asked to do it all over again." Kover v. Kover 29 N.Y.2d 408, 413, 278
N.E.2d 886, 887, 328 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (1972) (alimony case).
In various cases the Appellate Division has found the following changes to be
insufficiently compelling to warrant the requested increases: a wife's higher tax bracket,
see Halpern v. Klebanow, 21 A.D.2d 858, 251 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1st Dep't 1964); a child's
advancing age, see Rubin v. Rubin, 31 A.D.2d 739, 296 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1st Dep't 1969);
and inflation, see, e.g., Rubin v. Rubin, 31 A.D.2d 739, 296 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1st Dep't
1969); Unger v. Schiff, 277 A.D.123, 100 N.Y.S.2d 981 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed,
302 N.Y. 767, 98 N.E.2d 888 (1951). But see Coen v. Coen, 56 A.D.2d 810, 393
N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st Dep't), appeal dismissed, 42 N.Y.2d 966, 367 N.E.2d 654, 398 N.Y.S.
2d 148 (1977). Whether a father's increased income is a sufficient basis for modifica-
tion is not entirely settled. The Second Department has found this to be a sufficient
change of circumstances. See Eisen v. Eisen, 48 A.D.2d 652, 367 N.Y.S.2d 554 (2d
Dep't 1975); Handel v. Handel, 32 A.D.2d 946, 304 N.Y.S.2d 76 (2d Dep't 1969),
aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 853, 258 N.E.2d 94, 309 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1970); Swerdloff v. Weintraub,
26 A.D.2d 826, 273 N.Y.S.2d 905 (2d Dep't 1966). The first Department requires, in ad-
dition, a showing that the child's needs have also increased. See Coen v. Coen, 56 A.D.2d
810, 393 N.Y.S.2d 13; Fensterheim v. Fensterheim, 55 A.D.2d 516, 389 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1st
Dep't 1976); Klein v. Sheppard, 52 A.D.2d 532, 381 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1st Dep't 1976).
New York courts have recently suggested that where a court has incorporated the
support provisions of a separation agreement into a divorce decree without having in-
dependently evaluated the adequacy of such provisions, a child is entitled to a de novo
hearing as to their adequacy, irrespective of whether or not the circumstances have
changed. See Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 77 Misc. 2d 446, 353 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct.,
Nassau Co. 1974); Behren v. Behren, 72 Misc. 2d 70, 338 N.Y.S.2d 27 (Sup. Ct.,
Nassau Go. 1972) (parents divorced in Mexico); Weinel v. Weinel, 89 Misc. 2d 91,
391 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Fain. Ct., Rockland Co. 1977).
1978]
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Boden was not an action to modify a decree of divorce, annul-
ment or separation that had been rendered by a New York court; nor
was it an action to modify a support order that had already been is-
sued.20 Under section 461 (a), therefore, the Family Court was em-
powered to make an initial determination, independent of the agree-
ment, of the daughter's needs. From its brief opinion it appears that
the Appellate Division followed this approach.21 The Court of Ap-
peals, however, took a different tack. It acknowledged that a separa-
tion agreement could not constrain a judicial determination of an
appropriate amount of child support, and indicated that such a de-
termination required a consideration of the best interests of the child
and the capabilities of the parents. It then stated, somewhat contra-
dictorily:
Where, as here, the parties have included child support provisions
in their separation agreement, the court should consider these pro-
visions as between the parties and the stipulated allocation of finan-
cial responsibility should not be freely disregarded. It is to be as-
sumed that the parties anticipated the future needs of the child and
adequately provided for them. 22
Then, without any express finding as to either the daughter's needs
or the financial abilities of the parents, the court focused on the terms
of the separation agreement-an agreement that had been written
seventeen years earlier. It pointed out that the agreement was fair
and equitable when made, that it included a provision for child sup-
port which "the parties felt was adequate, ' 23 and that there had been
"no showing of an unforeseen change in circumstances." 24 Conse-
quently, it concluded, the Appellate Division had erred in modifying
the agreement's child support provisions.2 5
20. The support provisions of the parties' separation agreement were neither merged
nor incorporated in the California decree.
21. See 55 A.D.2d at 550-52, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 848-49.
22. 42 N.Y.2d at 212, 366 N.E.2d at 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 703.
23. See note 29 infra.
24. 42 N.Y.2d at 213, 366 N.E.2d at 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
Whether the provisions did in fact express the intent of the parties would seem to
be an open question. Since in 1960 $7,500 would probably have been adequate to pay
for a private college education, the parties may have intended that the father pay for
the entire cost of the daughter's education. In that case their intent would not have
been realized. Perhaps the court believed that the parties had intended to allocate a
fixed portion of the cost-namely, $7,500-to the father, and to assign to the mother a
variable portion-any costs above $7,500. The problem of construction here could have
been obviated by the parties' insertion of an automatic cost-of-living escalation clause.
24. 42 N.Y.2d at 213, 366 N.E.2d at 794, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 704.
25. The Court of Appeals stated: "The facts and circumstances here present did
not warrant a modification of the child support provision of the separation agreement and
[Vol. 27
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Did the court perhaps pay lip service to one criterion-a considera-
tion of the circumstances of all the parties-but actually apply another
-an examination of the equities of a contract at the time of its execu-
tion? The child's need for a college education, as evidenced in part
by her academic ability, and the parents' substantial incomes would
seem to constitute the relevant circumstances. In any event, the court
did not confront the task at hand: the mother had petitioned the
Family Court for an initial determination of the daughter's need and
far an original support order based on that determination. The word-
ing of section 461 (a) of the Family Court Act, 26 which would appear
to provide the relevant law, is difficult to reconcile with either the
Court of Appeals' concern about the fairness of the separation agree-
ment and the intention of the parents or its requirement that an un-
anticipated change of circumstances be shown. Had the mother
brought an action in the New York Supreme Court for an interpre-
tation of the separation agreement, then an examination of the parties'
intentions and the agreement's fairness might have been appropriate. 27
Had she petitioned the Family Court for a modification of a previ-
ously issued support order, then the "changed circumstances" test of
section 461 (b) would have been appropriate. 28 Since neither was the
case, however, neither consideration appears to have been immedi-
ately relevant.
At best, the actual rationale for the Court of Appeals' approach
is unclear. Perhaps the court implicitly found that a college educa-
tion is not a necessity for which a parent ought to be required to
provide29 Or perhaps the court decided sub silentio that the agree-
it was error for the Appellate Division to do so." Id. What is especially odd about this
statement is that the Appellate Division had not modified the separation agreement; it
had made an initial support determination: "[P]etitioner has demonstrated the need for
reasonable child support in a monthly amount of $250 and to the extent that respondent
makes support payments under the separation agreement, he defrays in part the obliga-
tion imposed by this determination." 55 A.D.2d at 551, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
26. For the full text of section 461(a), see note 13 supra.
27. This was suggested by one of the dissenting justices of the Appellate Division.
55 A.D.2d at 552, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 849 (Kupferman, J., dissenting).
28. See note 17 supra.
29. Claims for paternal support for college education have, in general, not fared
well in the New York courts. Section 416 of the Family Court Act empoyers the
Family Court to issue an order for support to provide necessaries, including "the ex-
pense of education." N.Y. FA. CT. ACT § 416 (McKinney 1975). But although
many courts have awarded support for college expenses, based on the child's talents,
see Kaplan v. Wallshein, 57 A.D.2d 828, 394 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1977); Weingast
v. Weingast, 44 Misc. 2d 952, 255 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Fam. Ct., Nassau Co. 1964), or the
parents' substantial financial resources and high station in life, see Kaplan v. Wallshein,
57 A.D.2d 828, 394 N.Y.S.2d 439 (2d Dep't 1977); Thaler v. Klein 55 A.D.2d 606,
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ment in this case would most likely result in adequate support for
the daughter, even if a private college education were a necessary part
of that support. Since at the time she petitioned the Family Court the
mother was earning $45,000 annually, it would not have been un-
reasonable to presume that she could and would bear any costs of her
daughter's education that exceeded the $3,675 per year provided by
the father under the separation agreement. 30 But if either of these
two possible rationales is what actually motivated the court in Boden,
then its holding should be narrowly limited to its peculiar facts. To
conclude otherwise, to suggest that courts ought to accord any weight
to separation agreements when making initial support determina-
tions, absent a finding that the agreement adequately provides for the
necessary support of the child, would directly contradict section
461 (a) of the Family Court Act as well as a considerable body of case
law.31
SUSAN K. VANDERLINDE
389 N.Y.S.2d 119 (2d Dep't 1976); Golden v. Golden, 37 A.D.2d 578, 323 N.Y.S.2d
714 (2d Dep't 1971); Herbert v. Herbert, 198 Misc. 515, 98 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Dom. Rel.
Ct., N.Y. Co. 1950), most of the cases reflect a belief that absent unusual circumstances,
a private college education is not a necessity which a parent ought to be ordered to
provide, see Tannenbaum v. Tannenbaum, 50 A.D.2d 539, 375 N.Y.S.2d 329 (Ist Dep't
1975); Hawley v. Doucette, 43 A.D.2d 713, 349 N.Y.S.2d 801 (2d Dep't 1973);
Halsted v. Halsted, 228 A.D. 298, 239 N.Y.S. 422 (2d Dep't 1930); Wagner v.
Wagner, 51 Misc. 2d 574, 273 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966), aff'd, 28
A.D.2d 828, 282 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Ist Dep't 1967). Even those courts denying such sup-
port, however, consistently uphold the trial court's power to examine the facts of the
case and to authorize such expenditures in its discretion. See, e.g., Matthews v. Matthews,
14 A.D.2d 546, 217 N.Y.S.2d 736 (2d Dep't 1961); Hahn v. Hahn, 44 A.D.2d 913,
356 N.Y.S.2d 231 (4th Dep't 1974). Furthermore, a parent who voluntarily con-
tracts by way of a separation agreement to provide educational support is thereby
obligated to do so. Berland v. Berland, 47 A.D.2d 540, 363 N.Y.S.2d III (2d Dep't
1975); see Hawley v. Doucette, 43 A.D.2d 713, 349 N.Y.S.2d 801 (2d Dep't 1973);
Halsted v. Halsted, 228 A.D. 298, 239 N.Y.S. 422 (2d Dep't 1930).
The New York Court of Appeals has never ruled on whether college can be a
necessary under any circumstances. Other jurisdictions citing the child's ability as
justification for college support include: Colorado, Van Orman v. Van Orman, 30 Colo.
App. 177, 492 P.2d 81 (1971); Mississippi, Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 118 So. 2d 769
(1960); and Ohio, Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juve-
nile Ct. 1959). Jurisdictions examining the father's financial resources include: Colo-
rado, Van Orman v. Van Orman, 30 Colo. App. 177, 492 P.2d 81 (1971); Maryland,
Groner v. Davis, 260 Md. 471, 272 A.2d 621 (1971); and New Jersey, Khalaf v.
Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971).
30. $1,875 annually under the endowment policy plus $1,800 annually in monthly
payments of $150.
31. See cases cited in notes 11 & 12 supra.
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